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In the paper [Zhang, Li and Guo, Phys. Rev. A 64, 024302 (2001)], a quantum key distribution
protocol based on quantum encryption was proposed, in which the quantum key can be reused.
However, it is shown that, if Eve employs a special strategy to attack, this protocol becomes insecure
because of the reused quantum key. That is, Eve can elicit partial information about the key bits
without being detected. Finally, a possible improvement of the Zhang-Li-Guo protocol is proposed.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.65.Ud
In Ref.[1], Zhang, Li and Guo proposed a quantum key
distribution protocol based on quantum encryption. This
protocol employs previously shared EPR pairs as a quan-
tum key to encode and decode the classical cryptography
key, and the quantum key is reusable. However, here we
will show that, this protocol would become insecure if
the quantum key is reused for more than two times.
For convenience, except for especial declarations, we
use the same notations as in Ref.[1]. Let us give a
brief description of the Zhang-Li-Guo protocol firstly
(see Fig. 1). At the beginning, Alice and Bob share
some quantity of EPR pairs serving as the quantum key:
|Φ+〉 = 1/√2(|00〉 + |11〉). To send the key bit (0 or 1)
to Bob, Alice prepares a carrier particle γ in the corre-
sponding state |ψ〉 (|0〉 or |1〉), performs a controlled-NOT
(CNOT) operation on γ and thus entangles this qubit to
the previously shared Bell state. Then she transmits this
qubit to Bob, from which Bob can obtain the key bit ψ
by performing a CNOT operation and a measurement on
it. Because every sending qubit is in a completely mixed
state, Eve can not extract information about the key bit.
Furthermore, to strengthen the security of this protocol,
Alice and Bob perform a rotation
R(
pi
4
) =
1√
2
(
1 1
−1 1
)
(1)
on their respective shared particles before encrypting
each |ψ〉.
It is well known that the shared particles in Bell state
have strong quantum correlation (i.e., entanglement). It
is this correlation that makes the quantum encryption
secure. The author of Ref.[1] argues that, because this
correlation cannot be produced by LQCC and the eaves-
dropper cannot establish this correlation with the sender,
the quantum key is reusable. However, they overlooked
a fact that the sending qubit would bring Eve the chance
to entangle her ancilla to the shared Bell state, which
∗Electronic address: hzpe@sohu.com
FIG. 1: The Zhang-Li-Guo protocol. Note that in this
Comment, for simplicity, the operation R(pi/4) ⊗ R(pi/4) or
R(pi/4)⊗3 is not included in our figures.
means that the eavesdropper can establish this correla-
tion with the sender. As a result, this protocol becomes
insecure when the quantum key is reused.
Now we come to Eve’s eavesdropping strategy. Con-
sider a certain EPR pair shared by Alice and Bob, which
will be used to encrypt γ1, γ2, γ3, ... (the corresponding
states are |ψ1〉, |ψ2〉, |ψ3〉, ... respectively, where ψi = 0 or
1). Hereafter we use the term “the i-th round” to denote
the processing procedures of γi, and Alice and Bob’s op-
eration R(pi/4)⊗R(pi/4) is taken as the beginning of each
round. Furthermore, we use |φi0〉A,B,E and |φi1〉A,B,E to
denote the states shared by Alice, Bob and Eve at the
beginning and the end of the i-th round, respectively.
In addition, the subscriptions A, B and E represent the
particles belong to Alice, Bob, and Eve respectively, and
γ represents the sending particle. Suppose Eve prepares
|0〉 as her ancilla, the eavesdropping strategy can be de-
scribed as follows:
(i) In the first round, Eve entangles her ancilla into the
Bell state shared by Alice and Bob. More specifically,
Eve intercepts the sending qubit and performs a CNOT
operation on her ancilla, then resends the sending qubit
to Bob (see Fig. 2). The initial state of Alice, Bob and
Eve’s particles can be represented as
|φ10〉A,B,E = 1√
2
(|0, 0, 0〉+ |1, 1, 0〉)A,B,E. (2)
2FIG. 2: Eve’s attack in the first round.
Then the states at various stages in Fig. 2 are as follows:
|Φ0〉 = 1√
2
(|0, 0, ψ1, 0〉+ |1, 1, ψ1, 0〉)A,B,γ,E, (3)
|Φ1〉 = 1√
2
(|0, 0, ψ1, 0〉+ |1, 1, ψ1, 0〉)A,B,γ,E, (4)
|Φ2〉 = 1√
2
(|0, 0, ψ1, ψ1〉+ |1, 1, ψ1, ψ1〉)A,B,γ,E, (5)
|Φ3〉 = 1√
2
(|0, 0, ψ1, ψ1〉+ |1, 1, ψ1, ψ1〉)A,B,γ,E, (6)
where the overline expresses bit flip, for example, ψ1 =
ψ1 + 1 modulo 2.
In the last stage, when Bob performs his CNOT opera-
tion, he disentangles the sending qubit |ψ1〉 and correctly
gets the value of ψ1, while the original Bell state has now
been entangled with the state of Eve in the form of
|φ11〉A,B,E = 1√
2
(|0, 0, ψ1〉+ |1, 1, ψ1〉)A,B,E . (7)
(ii) In the second round, Eve tries to avoid the detec-
tion and, at the same time, retain her entanglement with
Alice and Bob. As was proved in Ref.[1], Eve can not
obtain information in this round. However, we will show
that she can take some measures to avoid the detection.
Firstly, when Alice and Bob perform the operations
R(pi/4)⊗R(pi/4) on their “Bell state”, Eve also performs
R(pi/4) on her ancilla. As a result, the entangled state
of Alice, Bob and Eve will be converted into
|φ20〉A,B,E = R(pi
4
)⊗3|φ11〉A,B,E
=
1
2
[|0, 0, 0〉+ (−1)ψ1 |0, 1, 1〉
+(−1)ψ1|1, 0, 1〉+ |1, 1, 0〉]
A,B,E
, (8)
where the identity R(pi
4
)|ψ〉 = 1/√2[|0〉+ (−1)ψ|1〉] was
used.
Afterwards, Eve intercepts the sending qubit, performs
a CNOT operation on it, and then resends it to Bob (see
Fig. 3). The states at various stages in Fig. 3 are as
FIG. 3: Eve’s attack in the second round.
follows:
|Ψ0〉 = 1
2
[|0, 0, ψ2, 0〉+ (−1)ψ1 |0, 1, ψ2, 1〉
+ (−1)ψ1 |1, 0, ψ2, 1〉+ |1, 1, ψ2, 0〉
]
A,B,γ,E
, (9)
|Ψ1〉 = 1
2
[|0, 0, ψ2, 0〉+ (−1)ψ1 |0, 1, ψ2, 1〉
+ (−1)ψ1 |1, 0, ψ2, 1〉+ |1, 1, ψ2, 0〉
]
A,B,γ,E
,(10)
|Ψ2〉 = 1
2
[|0, 0, ψ2, 0〉+ (−1)ψ1 |0, 1, ψ2, 1〉
+ (−1)ψ1 |1, 0, ψ2, 1〉+ |1, 1, ψ2, 0〉
]
A,B,γ,E
,(11)
|Ψ3〉 = 1
2
[|0, 0, ψ2, 0〉+ (−1)ψ1 |0, 1, ψ2, 1〉
+ (−1)ψ1 |1, 0, ψ2, 1〉+ |1, 1, ψ2, 0〉
]
A,B,γ,E
.(12)
In the last stage, when Bob performs his CNOT opera-
tion, he disentangles the sending qubit |ψ2〉 and correctly
gets the value of ψ2, while leaving the state
|φ21〉A,B,E = 1
2
[|0, 0, 0〉+ (−1)ψ1 |0, 1, 1〉
+(−1)ψ1|1, 0, 1〉+ |1, 1, 0〉]
A,B,E
. (13)
(iii) In the third round, Eve eavesdrops the key bit.
Firstly, as in step (ii), Eve also performs R(pi/4) on her
ancilla when Alice and Bob perform R(pi/4) on their re-
spective particles. The entangled state will be changed
into
|φ30〉A,B,E = R(pi
4
)⊗3|φ21〉A,B,E
=
1
2
√
2
[
α (|0, 0, 0〉 − |1, 1, 1〉)
−β (|0, 0, 1〉 − |1, 1, 0〉) ]
A,B,E
, (14)
where α = 1 + (−1)ψ1 , β = 1− (−1)ψ1 .
Afterwards, Eve intercepts the sending qubit, performs
a CNOT operation, a measurement and another CNOT
operation on it, and then resends it to Bob (see Fig. 4).
3FIG. 4: Eve’s attack in the third round.
The states at various stages in Fig. 4 are as follows:
|Ω0〉 = 1
2
√
2
[
α (|0, 0, ψ3, 0〉 − |1, 1, ψ3, 1〉)
− β (|0, 0, ψ3, 1〉 − |1, 1, ψ3, 0〉)
]
A,B,γ,E
, (15)
|Ω1〉 = 1
2
√
2
[
α
(|0, 0, ψ3, 0〉 − |1, 1, ψ3, 1〉)
− β (|0, 0, ψ3, 1〉 − |1, 1, ψ3, 0〉) ]A,B,γ,E, (16)
|Ω2〉 = 1
2
√
2
[
α (|0, 0, ψ3, 0〉 − |1, 1, ψ3, 1〉)
− β (|0, 0, ψ3, 1〉 − |1, 1, ψ3, 0〉) ]A,B,γ,E, (17)
|Ω3〉 = 1
2
√
2
[
α
(|0, 0, ψ3, 0〉 − |1, 1, ψ3, 1〉)
− β (|0, 0, ψ3, 1〉 − |1, 1, ψ3, 0〉) ]A,B,γ,E, (18)
|Ω4〉 = 1
2
√
2
[
α (|0, 0, ψ3, 0〉 − |1, 1, ψ3, 1〉)
− β (|0, 0, ψ3, 1〉 − |1, 1, ψ3, 0〉)
]
A,B,γ,E
. (19)
It can be seen that Eve disentangles the key qubit by
a CNOT operation, and then restores the entangled state
by another CNOT operation after a measurement. As
a result, Eve obtains the measurement result ψ3 + ψ1
(modulo 2) and Bob correctly gets the value of ψ3. At
last, the entangled state of Alice, Bob and Eve can be
written as
|φ31〉A,B,E = 1
2
√
2
[
α (|0, 0, 0〉 − |1, 1, 1〉)
−β (|0, 0, 1〉 − |1, 1, 0〉) ]
A,B,E
. (20)
(iv) In the fourth round, Eve uses a similar strategy
as in the second round to avoid the detection, the only
difference is that Eve has to perform an additional X =(
0, 1
1, 0
)
operation on the sending qubit here (see Fig. 5).
After their operation R(pi
4
)⊗3, Alice, Bob and Eve change
FIG. 5: Eve’s attack in the fourth round.
the entangled state into
|φ40〉A,B,E = R(pi
4
)⊗3|φ31〉A,B,E
= −1
2
[|0, 0, 1〉+ (−1)ψ1 |0, 1, 0〉
+(−1)ψ1|1, 0, 0〉+ |1, 1, 1〉]
A,B,E
. (21)
Then Eve performs the operations as described in
Fig. 5. The states at various stages are as follows:
|Θ0〉 = −1
2
[|0, 0, ψ4, 1〉+ (−1)ψ1 |0, 1, ψ4, 0〉
+ (−1)ψ1 |1, 0, ψ4, 0〉+ |1, 1, ψ4, 1〉
]
A,B,γ,E
,(22)
|Θ1〉 = −1
2
[|0, 0, ψ4, 1〉+ (−1)ψ1 |0, 1, ψ4, 0〉
+ (−1)ψ1 |1, 0, ψ4, 0〉+ |1, 1, ψ4, 1〉
]
A,B,γ,E
,(23)
|Θ2〉 = −1
2
[|0, 0, ψ4, 1〉+ (−1)ψ1 |0, 1, ψ4, 0〉
+ (−1)ψ1 |1, 0, ψ4, 0〉+ |1, 1, ψ4, 1〉
]
A,B,γ,E
,(24)
|Θ3〉 = −1
2
[|0, 0, ψ4, 1〉+ (−1)ψ1 |0, 1, ψ4, 0〉
+ (−1)ψ1 |1, 0, ψ4, 0〉+ |1, 1, ψ4, 1〉
]
A,B,γ,E
.(25)
It can be seen that, in the last stage, Bob correctly
gets the value of ψ4, while leaving the state
|φ41〉A,B,E = −1
2
[|0, 0, 1〉+ (−1)ψ1 |0, 1, 0〉
+(−1)ψ1|1, 0, 0〉+ |1, 1, 1〉]
A,B,E
. (26)
(v) In the fifth round, Eve uses the same strategy as
in the third round to eavesdrop the key bit, that is, the
strategy in step (iii). After their operation R(pi
4
)⊗3, Al-
ice, Bob and Eve change the entangled state into
|φ50〉A,B,E = R(pi
4
)⊗3|φ41〉A,B,E
= − 1
2
√
2
[
α(|0, 0, 0〉+ |1, 1, 1〉)
+β(|0, 0, 1〉+ |1, 1, 0〉)]
A,B,E
. (27)
4Then Eve performs the operations as described in
Fig. 4. The states at various stages are as follows:
|Υ0〉 = − 1
2
√
2
[
α (|0, 0, ψ5, 0〉+ |1, 1, ψ5, 1〉)
+β (|0, 0, ψ5, 1〉+ |1, 1, ψ5, 0〉)
]
A,B,γ,E
, (28)
|Υ1〉 = − 1
2
√
2
[
α
(|0, 0, ψ5, 0〉+ |1, 1, ψ5, 1〉)
+β
(|0, 0, ψ5, 1〉+ |1, 1, ψ5, 0〉) ]A,B,γ,E, (29)
|Υ2〉 = − 1
2
√
2
[
α (|0, 0, ψ5, 0〉+ |1, 1, ψ5, 1〉)
+β
(|0, 0, ψ5, 1〉+ |1, 1, ψ5, 0〉) ]A,B,γ,E, (30)
|Υ3〉 = − 1
2
√
2
[
α
(|0, 0, ψ5, 0〉+ |1, 1, ψ5, 1〉)
+β
(|0, 0, ψ5, 1〉+ |1, 1, ψ5, 0〉) ]A,B,γ,E, (31)
|Υ4〉 = − 1
2
√
2
[
α (|0, 0, ψ5, 0〉+ |1, 1, ψ5, 1〉)
+β (|0, 0, ψ5, 1〉+ |1, 1, ψ5, 0〉)
]
A,B,γ,E
, (32)
where Υp corresponds to the state Ωp in Fig. 4 (p =
0, 1, 2, 3, 4). It can be seen that Eve’s measurement result
in this round is ψ5 + ψ1 (modulo 2).
Obviously, in the last stage, Bob correctly gets the
value of ψ5, while leaving the state
|φ51〉A,B,E = − 1
2
√
2
[
α(|0, 0, 0〉+ |1, 1, 1〉)
+β(|0, 0, 1〉+ |1, 1, 0〉)]
A,B,E
. (33)
Comparing the state |φ51〉A,B,E with |φ11〉A,B,E , we
can verify that the two states is equivalent except for a
global phase factor (i.e., −1). That is, from an obser-
vational point of view these two states are identical [2].
Therefore, in the following rounds, Eve can use the same
strategy as in the steps from (ii) to (v) repeatedly.
Now let us give a concretely description of our eaves-
dropping strategy:
1. In the first round, Eve performs the operations as
described in Fig. 2;
2. When Alice and Bob perform R(pi
4
) on their respec-
tive particles at the beginning of every round (ex-
cept for the first round), Eve also performs R(pi
4
)
on her ancilla;
3. From the second round to the fifth round, Eve per-
forms the operations as described in Fig. 3, Fig. 4,
Fig. 5 and Fig. 4 in turn;
4. In the following rounds, Eve performs the opera-
tions as described in item 3 repeatedly.
From the above analysis, we can see that in our eaves-
dropping strategy no error will be introduced to the key
distribution between Alice and Bob, and Eve will obtain
exactly the result of
ψ3 + ψ1, ψ5 + ψ1, ψ7 + ψ1, ψ9 + ψ1, . . .
from which she can infer about half of the key bits by
checking two possible values for ψ1. It should be empha-
sized that there is another profitable fact for Eve. That
is, at the end of QKD procedure, Alice and Bob will
compare a subsequence of the key bits publicly to detect
eavesdropping, which obviously leak useful information
to Eve.
Now it is worthwhile to inspect the basic idea of our at-
tack strategy. Though Eve cannot get information about
the key bit in every even rounds (as proved in Ref.[1]),
she can take some more clever measures to avoid the de-
tection and retain her entanglement with Alice and Bob
so that she can eavesdrop the key bit in the next round.
Our attack strategy is exactly based on this fact. By our
strategy, if the shared Bell states are reused for many
times, Eve can obtain about half of the key bits without
being detected by Alice and Bob. One may argue that
the shared Bell states would not be reused for too many
times without special treatments by Alice and Bob, such
as quantum privacy amplification and entanglement pu-
rification [1]. However, from above analysis it can be seen
that Eve needs only three rounds to elicit partial informa-
tion about the key bits, which definitely forms a serous
threaten to the Zhang-Li-Guo protocol. In fact, the QKD
protocols in Refs.[3, 4] have similar hidden troubles, see
Refs.[5, 6] for details.
Before we conclude, let us give a discussion about the
rotation
R(θ) =
(
cos θ sin θ
− sin θ cos θ
)
, (34)
which plays an important role in the Zhang-Li-Guo pro-
tocol. Without Alice and Bob’s rotations at the begin-
ning of every round, this QKD protocol would be inse-
cure. For example, in this condition Eve can entangle her
ancilla into the Bell state in the first round (as described
in Fig. 2), and then elicit information about the key bits
in the following rounds (as described in Fig. 4). As a
result, Eve will obtain the result of
ψ2 + ψ1, ψ3 + ψ1, ψ4 + ψ1, ψ5 + ψ1, . . . .
(To avoid confusion we call this attack strategy S1, and
call the strategy we showed in above paragraphs S2.)
Therefore, the rotations are necessary, and pi/4 is selected
as the rotation angle because it leads to the maximum
error rate (i.e., 1/2) caused by Eve when she uses the
strategy S1 [1]. However, it is the selection of θ = pi/4
that makes the Zhang-Li-Guo protocol insecure against
S2. That is, the error rate caused by Eve is 0 when
she uses the strategy S2. Hereafter we use d1 and d2
to denote the error rate corresponding to S1 and S2, re-
spectively. In fact, it is not difficult to prove that, if
θ 6= kpi ± pi/4 (k = 0,±1,±2, ...), it is impossible for Eve
5to elicit information about the key bits without introduc-
ing disturbance (See the Appendix for details). Conse-
quently, by altering θ, we can modify the Zhang-Li-Guo
protocol so that it can resist both S1 and S2.
As was given in Ref.[1], when Eve uses S1 to at-
tack, the error rate is d1 = 2 cos
2 θ sin2 θ. By simi-
lar deduction we can obtain the error rate when S2 is
used, i.e., d2 =
1
2
(sin2 θ − cos2 θ)2. Clearly, there is a
trade-off between d1 and d2, which satisfy the ralation of
d1 + d2 = 1/2. That is, a greater d1 results in a smaller
d2, and vice versa. It can be seen that θ = pi/4 is a
extreme instance, where d1 reaches its maximum value
1/2 but d2 = 0. Therefore, we can select such a ro-
tation angle (denoted as θ0) that d1 = d2 = 1/4, i.e.,
2 cos2 θ0 sin
2 θ0 = 1/4. As a result, when we use θ0 in-
stead of pi/4 in the Zhang-Li-Guo protocol, it can resist
both attack strategies (because either strategy will in-
troduce an error rate of 1/4). We have to confess that
this modification decreases the efficiency of eavesdrop-
ping detection. However, 1/4 is still a sufficient value
for a detection probability. In fact, as far as the gen-
eral intercept-resend strategy is concerned, the detection
probability in BB84 protocol [7] is 1/4, too.
In summary, we have presented a special attack strat-
egy to the Zhang-Li-Guo protocol [1], in which Eve can
elicit partial information about the key bits without be-
ing detected when the quantum key is reused for more
than two times. Furthermore, we have discussed about
the ralation between the security and the value of θ, and
pointed out that this QKD protocol would be secure if
we use θ0 instead of pi/4.
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APPENDIX
In this appendix we will show that when θ 6= kpi±pi/4
(k = 0,±1,±2, ...), it is inevitable for Eve to introduce
disturbance if she has entangled her ancilla into the Bell
state in the first round.
Without loss of generality, suppose that in the first
round Eve’s system has entangled with Alice and Bob’s
key in the state
|Λ〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉|ϕ0〉+ |11〉|ϕ1〉)A,B,E , (A.1)
where there is no restriction on the form of |ϕ0〉 and |ϕ1〉.
After Alice and Bob do a bilateral rotation R(θ), Alice
does a CNOT operation on the sending qubit |ψ2〉 and
sends it out. Then Eve does a unitary transformation
on the sending qubit and her own system. She expects
that Alice and Bob cannot detect her existence (i.e., the
error rate caused by her is 0). Assume that the unitary
transformation has the universal form
Uγ,E|i〉γ |ϕj〉E = (aij |0〉|ϕaij〉+ bij |1〉|ϕbij〉)γ,E , (A.2)
where i, j = 0, 1 and there is no restriction on the final
state of |ϕ〉E . At last, Bob receives the sending qubit and
uses a CNOT operation to disentangle it from the shared
state.
Suppose that the composite system |Λ〉A,B,E⊗|ψ2〉γ is
changed into |∆〉 after all the above operations, we can
easily write the form of the state |∆〉. If the attack is
successful, it requires that the sending qubit |ψ2〉 is cor-
rectly disentangled by Bob. To satisfy this requirement,
we obtain the following results:
When ψ2 = 0, we get
b00 cos
2 θ|ϕb00〉+ b01 sin2 θ|ϕb01〉 = 0, (A.3)
−a00 sin θ cos θ|ϕa00〉+ a01 sin θ cos θ|ϕa01〉 = 0, (A.4)
−b10 sin θ cos θ|ϕb10〉+ b11 sin θ cos θ|ϕb11〉 = 0, (A.5)
a10 sin
2 θ|ϕa10〉+ a11 cos2 θ|ϕa11〉 = 0. (A.6)
When ψ2 = 1, we get
a10 cos
2 θ|ϕa10〉+ a11 sin2 θ|ϕa11〉 = 0, (A.7)
b00 sin
2 θ|ϕb00〉+ b01 cos2 θ|ϕb01〉 = 0, (A.8)
where we omit two equations the same as Eqs.(A.4) and
(A.5).
With the help of Eqs.(A.1)∼(A.8), we then obtain two
possible conditions: either (1) |ϕ0〉 = |ϕ1〉, which means
|Λ〉 is a product state of Eve’s ancilla and Alice and Bob’s
Bell state; or (2) θ = kpi ± pi/4. This result implies that
only when θ = kpi ± pi/4 Eve can entangle her ancilla
into the Bell state without introducing any disturbance,
which is the exact conclusion we want to prove.
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